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Model Checking for E-Business Control and Assurance
Bonnie Brinton Anderson, James V. Hansen, Paul Benjamin Lowry,
and Scott L. Summers
Abstract—Model checking is a promising technique for the veriﬁcation of
complex software systems. As the use of the Internet for conducting e-business extends the reach of many organizations, well-designed software becomes the foundation of reliable implementation of e-business processes.
These distributed, electronic methods of conducting transactions place reliance on the control structures embedded in the transaction processes.
Deﬁciencies in control structures of processes that support e-business can
lead to loss of physical assets, digital assets, money, and consumer conﬁdence. Yet, assessing the reliability of e-business processes is complex and
time-consuming.
This paper explicates how model-checking technology can aid in the
design and assurance of e-business processes in complex digital environments. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate how model checking can be used to
verify e-business requirements concerning money atomicity, goods atomicity, valid receipt, and communication-link failure. These requirements
are fundamental to many e-business applications.
Model checking can be used to test a broad range of systems requirements—not only for system designers, but also for auditors and security
specialists. Systems that are examined by auditors need to have adequate
controls built in prior to implementation and will need adequate auditing
after implementation to ensure that none of the processes have been corrupted. Model checkers may also provide value in examining the processes
of highly integrated applications as found in enterprise resource planning
systems.
Index Terms—Atomicity, data typing, e-Business, model checking,
process and communication protocols.

I. INTRODUCTION
Internet-based business operations offer considerable potential, but
they are accompanied by a broad range of often unprecedented risks.
An actual or perceived lack of system security and reliability can signiﬁcantly constrain the growth of the digital economy. While progress
is being made in reducing Internet computational risks through a variety of software patches and cryptographic algorithms, these efforts
address only a small portion of the larger challenge of establishing the
necessary security and reliability of e-business systems. To resolve this
challenge, systematic management of the associated operational risks
is essential [1].
According to Wang et al. [2], management of operational risks requires careful examination of the e-business infrastructure. Distributed
Internet computing is changing e-market structures and e-business
models in fundamental ways. Although the ﬂexibility of distributed
e-operations supports open accessibility and dynamic interactions,
ﬂexibility can intensify problems arising from e-market information
asymmetry and e-business operational uncertainty. These problems
militate against innovative e-commerce developments. Although
e-commerce offers the opportunity for businesses to gain efﬁciency
and effectiveness through network-based ad-hoc partnerships, many
businesses do not take advantage of these opportunities because of the
heightened risks of operational uncertainty and perceived information
asymmetry among unfamiliar business partners.
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These issues take on added importance as new business models and
architectures—such as Internet auctions, web services [3] and the semantic web [4]—offer broad support for loosely coupled, e-commerce
transactions where buyers and sellers may not have any prior trading
experience with one another. For example, the web services [3] platform provides the Universal Description, Discovery and Integration
(UDDI) registry for discovery of e-commerce services, WSDL for service description, and SOAP for transaction execution. These facilities
require no prior knowledge of buyer and seller by either party.
In such environments, merchants and customers may be reluctant to
trust one another and the following situations may arise: A customer is
unwilling to pay for a product without being certain the correct product
will be sent. A merchant is unwilling to send a product without certainty of receiving payment. If a merchant delivers the product without
receiving payment, a fraudulent customer may receive the product and
then disappear, with a resulting loss to the merchant. If a customer pays
before receiving the product, a merchant may not deliver or may deliver
a wrong product. These possibilities underscore the need for carefully
designed e-commerce models that are robust under all events.
As Wang et al. [5] note, e-system complexity and human limitations make it impossible to imagine all scenarios and guarantee correct processing under all circumstances—even for carefully designed
and implemented code. Much of this difﬁculty is due to interconnectivity, which widens the potential range of error or vulnerability. Variation in execution of concurrent processes in nonstop, nondeterministic
systems increases the potential for automation failures. Consequently,
minimizing ﬂaws in transaction protocols is crucial for the survival and
sustainability of e-business. Stakeholders, such as system designers,
users, and auditors need methods to preclude these subtle but potentially critical mistakes—before erroneous processing occurs or an attacker exploits them—to enhance control and assurance to e-commerce
users. Model checking offers a promising method for addressing these
issues.
II. MODEL CHECKING FUNDAMENTALS
Automation failures occur when an automated system behaves differently than its stakeholders expect. If the actual system behavior and
the stakeholders model are both described as ﬁnite state transition systems, then mechanized techniques known as model checking can be
used to automatically discover any scenarios that cause the behaviors
of the two descriptions to diverge from one another. These scenarios
identify potential failures and pinpoint areas where design changes or
revisions should be considered.
Model checking can trace through all relevant states with respect to
any given requirement. Since model checking operates on logic rather
than individual execution paths, veriﬁcation can be more thorough and
efﬁcient than test runs and simulation. Some of the most compelling
features of model checkers are summarized as follows [6].
1) They help delimit a system’s boundary or the interface between
the system and its environment.
2) They precisely deﬁne a system’s desired properties.
3) They characterize a system’s behavior more accurately. Most
current methods focus on functional behavior only (e.g., “What
is the correct answer?”) but some can handle real-time behavior
as well (e.g., “Is the correct answer delivered on time?”).
4) They can aid in proving that a system meets required speciﬁcations. By providing counterexamples that show how speciﬁcations are not satisﬁed, model checkers can pinpoint the circumstances under which a system does not meet its speciﬁcations.
This can also help to correct the system.
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These features of model checkers aid stakeholders in two important
ways.
1) Through speciﬁcation, by focusing a system designer’s attention
to crucial questions, such as: What is the interface? What are the
assumptions about the application’s environment? What is the
system supposed to do under this condition or that condition?
What happens if that condition is not met? What are the system’s
invariant properties?
2) Through veriﬁcation, by providing additional assurance. Relying on proof that a system meets its security goals is better
than relying on opinion—even expert opinion.
It should be emphasized that any proof of correctness is relative to
both the formal speciﬁcation of a system and the formal speciﬁcation
of the desired properties: a system proven correct with respect to an
incorrect speciﬁcation leaves no assurance about the system at all.
The process of proving entails three actions: First, the system of
interest must be modeled. A mathematical model is constructed that
expresses the semantic structure of an e-business implementation.
Second, all properties to be guaranteed in the implementation are formally speciﬁed. In an e-business context, one such speciﬁcation might
be that goods must always be received before payment is initiated.
Third, a proof is provided. Typically, a proof relies on induction over
traces of the e-commerce communication and transaction operations.
In general, verifying that any e-business process is resilient to hidden
ﬂaws and errors is a daunting task. Manual methods are slow and error
prone. Even theorem provers, which provide a formal structure for verifying standard characteristics, may require human intervention and can
be time-consuming. Moreover, even if a failure is found using a theorem prover, it may provide little help in locating the source of the
failure [2]. Simulations offer computational power, but they are ad hoc
in nature and there is no guarantee they will explore all important contingencies [2].
In contrast, model checking is an evolving technology that can provide effective and efﬁcient evaluation of e-business processes. Model
checking was originally developed for validating highly complex
integrated circuits and software packages [7], [8], but it has recently
been adopted to tackle the complexity of e-commerce transactions [9],
[2], [10]. Current model-checking technology is based on automated
techniques that are considerably faster and more robust than other
approaches, such as simulation or theorem proving. Model checkers
can analyze very large state spaces in minutes. Additionally, model
checkers aid failure correction by supplying counterexamples when
processing failures are discovered [11].
Although model checking is still relatively new [9], [2], [10], it has
shown impressive performance in the analysis of complex hardware and
software processes [7], [8]. The extended fair-exchange protocol [10]
used in this paper incorporates methods fundamental to a broad class
of e-business processes, including distributed processing, parallelism,
concurrency, communication uncertainties, and continuous operations.
For this study, we use the failures-divergence reﬁnement (FDR) model
checker, which is based on the concurrency theory of communicating
sequential processes (CSP) [8]. FDR veriﬁes whether a requirement is
satisﬁed in a particular system design by performing tests on a reﬁnement
of that system. That is to say, veriﬁcation is done by comparing the two
models to check whether one is a reﬁnement of the other.
A CSP process is represented as a labeled transition system (LTS),
which is a set of nodes representing the states of the process that are connected by directed arcs, labeled with an event. LTS describes the evolution of state transition. Starting from the distinguished node n0 , the state
is always one of the nodes, and progress is made by performing one of
the actions possible for that node. Most actions are visible to the external
environment and can only happen with its cooperation. Internal actions
cannot be seen from the outside or occur automatically [8].

Such trace reﬁnements are normally used for proving required
properties. The reﬁnement-checking algorithm in FDR is abstracted
as follows:
BEGIN
Initialize explorer with a pair of initial nodes;
WHILE
explorer is not complete
Examine a fresh pair of nodes from the explorer
IF
Nodes are compatible in appropriate model
THEN
Add mutually reachable successor pairs to explorer
ELSE
Return counterexample with explorer path to this pair
END
END

The objective is to establish that performance requirements are satisﬁed by the system design.
III. CASE STUDY
Fig. 1 represents the high-level abstraction of a protocol proposed
in [10]. The essential processes are summarized in the following paragraphs. We ﬁrst provide an overview and then provide the necessary
details for model checking.
Messages are exchanged between a customer, a merchant, and a
trusted third party (TTP). A merchant has several digital products to
sell. The merchant places a description of each product in an online
catalog service with a TTP, along with a copy of the encrypted product.
When a customer ﬁnds a product of interest by browsing the catalog, the
customer downloads the encrypted product and then sends a purchase
order to the merchant. The customer cannot use the product unless it
has been decrypted, and the merchant does not send the decrypting key
unless the merchant receives a payment token through the purchase
order process. The customer does not pay unless the customer is sure
that the correct and complete product has been received. The TTP provides anonymous support for purchase order validation, payment token
approval, and approval of the overall transaction between the customer
and the merchant.
At a detailed level, the customer ﬁrst browses the product catalog located at the TTP and chooses a product. The customer then downloads
the encrypted product along with the product identiﬁer, which is a ﬁle
that contains information about the product such as its description and
checksum. If the identiﬁer of the encrypted product ﬁle matches the
identiﬁer in the product identiﬁer ﬁle, the transaction proceeds. If the
identiﬁers do not match, an advice is send to the TTP, and the customer
waits for the correct encrypted product ﬁle. This process ensures that
the customer receives the product that was requested from the catalog.
Next, the customer prepares a purchase order (PO) containing the customer’s identity, the merchant identiﬁer, the product identiﬁer, and the
product price. A cryptographic checksum is also prepared. The PO,
along with the cryptographic checksum, is then sent to the merchant.
The combination of the PO and cryptographic checksum allows the
merchant to ascertain whether the received PO is complete or whether
it was altered in transit. Upon receipt of the PO, the merchant examines its contents. If the merchant is satisﬁed with the PO, the merchant
endorses it and digitally signs the cryptographic checksum of the endorsed PO. This is forwarded to the TTP. The TTP is involved in the
process to prevent the merchant from later claiming nonacceptance of
the terms and conditions of the transaction. The merchant also sends
the TTP a single-use decrypting key for the product. The merchant
next sends a copy of the encrypted product to the customer, together
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Fig. 1. Sequence diagram for comprehensive e-Business protocol.
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with a signed cryptographic checksum. The signed cryptographic
checksum establishes the product origin and also provides a check to
verify whether the product has been corrupted during transit.
Upon receipt of this second copy of the encrypted product, the customer validates that the ﬁrst and second copies of the product are identical. Through this process, the customer can be assured of receiving the
actual product ordered. The customer then requests the decrypting key
from the TTP. To do this, the customer forwards the PO and a signed
payment token to the TTP, together with the cryptographic checksum.
The payment token contains the customer’s identity, the identity of the
customer’s ﬁnancial institution, the customer’s bank account number
with the ﬁnancial institution, and the amount to be debited from the
customer’s account.
To verify the transaction, the TTP ﬁrst compares the digest included
in the PO from the customer with the digest of the same PO from the
merchant. If the two do not match, the TTP aborts the transaction. Otherwise, the TTP proceeds by validating the payment token with the customer’s ﬁnancial institution by presenting the token and the sale price.
If the ﬁnancial institution does not validate the token, the TTP aborts
the transaction and advises the merchant accordingly. If the ﬁnancial
institution does validate the token, the TTP sends the decrypting key
to the customer and the payment token to the merchant, both digitally
signed with the TTP’s private key.
Secure channels guarantee the conﬁdentiality of all messages
throughout this protocol. The protocol ensures money atomicity if the
payment token generated by the customer contains the amount to be
debited from the customer’s account and credited to the merchant’s
account. Consequently, no money is created or destroyed in the system
by this protocol.
Goods atomicity is guaranteed if the TTP hands over the payment
token only when the customer acknowledges receipt of the product.
The process also ensures that the product is actually available to the
customer for use only when the customer consents to payment by acknowledging receipt of the product.
Delivery veriﬁcation is guaranteed if the TTP receives a cryptographic checksum of the product from the merchant. Also, the
customer independently generates a checksum of the product received
and sends it to the TTP. Using these two copies of the checksum (available at the TTP), both the merchant and the customer demonstrate
proof of the contents of the delivered good.
Controls are integrated into the modeling process by specifying
limits or boundaries within the model. We offer several examples:
Message types in the implementation can be constrained such that only
certain types can be sent by the various agents. For example, it can
be asserted that a customer may send only certain types of messages
to the TTP and merchant. The e-business model can then be tested to
determine if this speciﬁcation can be violated under any conditions.
The content allowable in various messages can be also be stipulated
and tested. It also may be important to specify the conditions under
which agents can abort a transaction, if at all.
Therearealso issues of protection from interruption. Systemsare often
designed under the assumption that transaction links are completely reliable. The reality may be that technical failures or attacks may undermine
this expectation. It is safer to specify and verify properties to cope with
unreliable communications or communication failures.
IV. MODEL CHECKING THE SYSTEM
For purposes of demonstration, we encoded the above-described
e-business system [10] in the model checker FDR. FDR has been used
in a variety of hardware and software applications, and has recently
been applied toward testing for atomicity in two commercial e-commerce payment systems [9]. We illustrate several control features

of model checking in the discourse that follows. We intend for the
discussion to be nontechnical and use actual code only when it is
straightforward; in other instances, we use pseudocode.
A. Data Types and Message Control
We ﬁrst consider the use of data typing. Data typing allows an analyst to ensure that only speciﬁed types of messages are communicated
from one trading party to another. Consider the following data-type
speciﬁcations:
--Data types
key

data type KEY

po

data type PO

data type ENCRYPTEDGOODS

eGoodsValid eGoodsInvalid

paymentToken

data type TOKEN
data type MESSAGE

transAborted

--Channel declarations
channel coutm:

po

channel moutc:

eGoodsValid, eGoodsInvalid

channel moutt:

key1

channel toutc:

key1, eGoodsValid, eGoodsInvalid,

transAborted
channel toutm:

paymentToken,

transAborted
channel minc:

po

channel tinc:

paymentToken

channel cinm:

eGoodsValid, eGoodsInvalid

channel tinm:

key

channel cint:

key, eGoodsValid, eGoodsInvalid,

transAborted
channel mint:

paymentToken,

transAborted
channel coutt:

paymentToken

In this example, all of the data types are simple, except for encrypted
goods, which allows two values: eGoodsValid (for valid encrypted
goods) and eGoodsInvalid (for invalid encrypted goods). In general,
any ﬁnite number of values for a data type can be speciﬁed. This useful
control is used to specify the messages allowed on various channels
as shown above. For instance, the only allowable transmissions on the
channel toutm (for channel out from TTP to merchant) are paymentToken or transAborted messages. Any other message by an intruder
would be disallowed.
Another example concerns the channel cint (for channel in to the customer from the trusted-third party): The only allowable messages are a
key, eGoodsValid, eGoodsInvalid, or transAborted. One might ask why
eGoodsInvalid is allowed since this represents an invalid product. The
reason is that it is not known that eGoodsInvalid is invalid until the customer checks the product against the description of the ordered product.
The remaining channels impose similar restrictions. If the system is expressed in this way, the model checker can later verify whether there
are any circumstances under which these constraints can be violated.
B. Ensuring Transaction Completion
Three of the most important requirements of e-business trading are
as follows.
1) Money is neither created nor destroyed in the course of an
e-commerce transaction. A transaction should ensure the
transfer of funds from one party to another without the possibility of the creation or destruction of money. No viable
e-business payment method can exist without supporting this
property [13], which is commonly known as money atomicity.
2) Both the customer and merchant receive evidence that the goods
sent (or received) are those to which both parties agreed. This
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is of particular importance when dealing with goods that can
be transferred electronically (as we do here). This property is
commonly known as valid receipt. The combination of both 1
and 2 is fundamental [14].
3) The customer must be able to verify that the product about to
be received from the merchant is the same as the product that
was ordered, before the customer pays for the product [15]. This
property is commonly known as goods atomicity.
Modelcheckingallowsus toverifythatour systemguarantees theserequirements by writing them as speciﬁcations in the model checker. FDR
returns the results of these large search spaces expeditiously. If a speciﬁcation is not satisﬁed, the model checker returns a counterexample that
allowsananalysttoquicklyseehowtherequirementcanbeviolated.This,
in turn, aids in modifying the system to resolve the problem. As an example, we consider a speciﬁcation for requirement 1 above.
Speciﬁcation requirement 1
IF NOT transaction trace

STOP

OR
customer sends paymentToken to TTP;
merchant receives paymentToken from TTP;
STOP;
OR
customer sends paymentToken to TTP;
customer receives transAborted message from TTP;
STOP;
THEN
Requirement 1 is violated;
End requirement 1;

This speciﬁcation asserts the following:
1) The customer must send payment to the TTP, and the merchant
must subsequently receive that payment from the TTP, or
2) The customer can send payment to the TTP and (in the case
where the payment is invalid) the customer then receives a transaction aborted message from the TTP.
3) If neither speciﬁciation 1) nor 2) is satisﬁed, the requirement is
violated.
The following is an example of what the model checker might return
as a counterexample in case the requirement fails under some set of
conditions.
1) The customer receives the encrypted goods from the TTP and
then sends a purchase order to the merchant.
2) The merchant sends the encrypted goods to the customer and
sends a key to the TTP, after which the encrypted goods are
received by the customer who sends a payment token to the TTP.
3) The TTP then receives the key from the merchant and the payment token from the customer.
4) The TTP sends the payment token to the merchant, after which
the customer receives the key from the TTP. The process then
stops. Since the next step should have been the receipt of the
payment token by the merchant (from the TTP), we know where
to look to examine the failure.
In the above case, the model checker showed that the failure occurred
in the e-process that controls the sending of a decrypting key from
the merchant to the TTP. Once this failure was identiﬁed, the problem
was identiﬁed and rectiﬁed as shown by a subsequent run of the model
checker.
C. Controlling Communication Link Failures
Suppose, however, that unreliability exists on the link from the merchant to the TTP. Such link unreliability could result from technical
failure, as well as malicious intrusion by a hacker. Consideration of
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this contingency can be included in model-checker representation by
the following e-process:
Procedure comm mc
IF product is IN eGoodsValid, eGoodsInvalid
THEN
CUSTOMER receives product from MERCHANT OR
PROCEDURE comm mc;
End comm mc;

This representation means that if all goes well, the transmittal of a
payment token from the customer to the TTP will be followed by the
receipt of a payment token from the customer. Yet the comm mc procedure above allows unspeciﬁed delays because each transmission can
nondeterministically be followed over and over by the comm mc procedure. What happens when we subject our unreliable link to examination by the model checker? It returns the following counterexample.
1) The valid encrypted goods are sent from the TTP and received
by the customer.
2) A purchase order is transmitted from the customer and received
by the merchant.
3) The merchant sends the valid encrypted goods, which are received by the customer; the merchant also sends a key to the
TTP, which is received.
4) The customer sends a payment token to the TTP, which is received.
5) The TTP sends a key to the customer, which is received.
6) The TTP sends a payment to the merchant, but this payment is
not received.
The model checker has found a failure that violates both requirement
1 and requirement 2. An inspection of the requirement 1 speciﬁcation
repeated below shows that the sending of a payment token from the
customer to the TTP must ﬁnally be followed by the receipt of that
token by the merchant (sent by the TTP) or by the transmittal of a
transaction aborted message from the TTP to the customer.
Speciﬁcation requirement 1
IF NOT transaction trace

STOP

OR
customer sends paymentToken to TTP;
merchant receives paymentToken from TTP;
STOP;
OR
customer sends paymentToken to TTP;
customer receives transAborted message from TTP;
STOP;
THEN
requirement 1 is violated;
End requirement 1;

In addition, requirement 2 stipulates that a customer receives the
product only after the customer has paid for the product. Since the
merchant never received the payment token, no encrypted goods were
transmitted from the merchant to the customer. These problems can be
resolved by modifying the comm mc procedure in the following way:
Procedure comm mc
IF product is IN eGoodsValid, eGoodsInvalid
THEN
CUSTOMER receives product from MERCHANT OR
PROCEDURE time out;
End comm mc;
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The time out procedure aborts the transaction if goods are not received within a speciﬁed period. Adding this procedure obviates the
problem identiﬁed above.
There are other areas of possible vulnerability that can be explored
in a similar fashion. The point of these examples is to demonstrate that
once a requirement is speciﬁed, its implementation can readily be veriﬁed with a model checker. This is a critical step in designing e-business
standards since translating concepts to implementation often leads to
error or omission.
V. DISCUSSION
The objective of this paper is to provide an accessible explication
and demonstration of the efﬁciency and effectiveness of using a model
checker to evaluate the reliability of transaction protocols within
e-business processes. In particular, when many processes are distributed and automated, there are many states within those processes
that need to be evaluated. Evidence suggests that such an evaluation
is beyond the practical capabilities of manual procedures, theorem
provers, and simulation, leaving e-business partners vulnerable to unforeseen failures and corresponding costs and losses. Model checkers
do not guarantee discovery of all vulnerabilities; but if designers are
able to identify a full range of speciﬁcations that a system must satisfy,
model checkers provide efﬁcient and effective veriﬁcation. Notably,
model checkers provide counterexamples that deﬁne sequences of
processes that lead to failure.
We have shown that the key elements of an e-business protocol can
be represented using a model checker such as FDR. Since the elements
of the e-business protocol that we have incorporated in this study are a
subset of the protocols within a large class of e-business applications,
there is considerable potential for broader applications. Given current
concerns about Internet security, model checkers may have potential in
both designing and auditing a variety of system implementations. For
example, as web-support services develop the capability for accessing
public registries of vendors, both search and subsequent transaction
processes may beneﬁt from application of model-checking technology.
Model checkers may also prove valuable in examining the processes
of highly integrated applications found in enterprise resource-planning
(ERP) systems.
A feature of model checking that should be of particular interest to
e-business designers is the capability of developing speciﬁcation statements that must be satisﬁed by implementation. For demonstration purposes, our presentation has focused on money atomicity, goods atomicity, valid receipt, and communication link failures because these are
fundamental to e-business; however, model checking can be used to
test a wide variety of protocol features. This approach should help not
only systems designers, but also auditors. Systems that are examined
by auditors need to have adequate controls built in prior to implementation and will need adequate auditing after implementation to ensure
that none of the processes have been corrupted.
Whereas model checking provides a viable formal method for evaluating the security and reliability of e-business processes, some limitations apply. As noted previously, there is little purpose in verifying
an e-business system with an incorrect model. This study assumes the
model will be correctly deﬁned and coded into a model checker. Model
checkers do not build correct models; instead, they help verify the
models.
The CSP model-checking language can be complex for practitioners
to use, but more accessible approaches are becoming available. For example, a recently developed model-checking language called Casper
has overcome CSP’s complexity by adding a higher-level language

whose interpreter translates code into CSP. Whatever language is used,
it is important to emphasize that once a speciﬁcation is veriﬁed it can
be continually reused, regardless of the system used to conduct the
process. Thus, the up-front investment in process modeling and model
checking can yield long-term dividends in terms of system security and
reliability as system upgrades and changes are implemented.
Future research could explore issues related to ensuring the accuracy
of the model coded into the model checker. Additional studies could
also examine ways to educate potential users of e-business systems on
features that have been veriﬁed and their meaning. Research might also
be conducted on comparative performance and efﬁciency of alternative
model checkers. Finally, empirical tests of model-checking principles
may help to validate the accuracy and effectiveness of these theories.
VI. CONCLUSION
E-business is moving forward at a rapid pace across the globe, exposing businesses to e-business processes that rely on interdependencies among customers, merchants, and TTPs. New e-business foci, such
as web services and pervasive computing, will extend the reach of
e-business, but these may also increase complexity and exposure possibilities. This will necessitate proactive veriﬁcation of related models.
Model checking could become a fundamental tool in this process.
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